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Abstract
The present article uses agent-based social simulation to study rational behaviour in networked innovation. A
simulation model that includes network characteristics and network participant's characteristics is run using
parameter sweeping, yielding 1450 simulation cases. The notion of coalitions was used to denote partnerships
in networked innovation. Coalitions compete against each other and several variables were observed for
winning coalitions. Close analysis of the variations and their influence on the average power per winning
coalition was analysed using stepwise multiple regression analysis. The analysis brought forward two main
conclusions. First, as average betweenness centrality per winning coalition increases, the average power per
winning coalition decreases. This implies that having high betweenness centrality as a network participant
makes it easier to build a successful coalition, as a coalition needs lower average power to succeed. Second, as
the number of network participants increases, the average power per winning coalition decreases. This implies
that in a larger network, it may be easier to form a successful coalition. The results form the basis for the
development of a utility-based recommendation system that helps people choose optimal partners in an
innovation network.
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Variable Variable	abbreviation Range Increment Initial	value
Betweenness	centrality Cbi 1	–	∞ n/a n/a
Creativity Cri 0	–	100 progressive n/a
Power Pi 0	–	100 progressive
Gender Geni 0	=	female,	1	=	male n/a random
Age Agei 15	–	65 1 15	+	Random(50)
Belbin	personality Beli 1	–	9 1 Random(9)
Perceived	idea	value vij 0	–	100 progressive n/a
Similarity Simik -50	–	50 1 n/a
Belbin	similarity SimBelik 0	–	100 100	(Boolean) n/a
Age	similarity SimAgeik 0	–	100 1 n/a





# Name Abbreviation Formula Variables
1 Creativity Cri Cri	=	w3	*	Cbi w3,	Cbi








5 Agent	score Scorej Scorej	=	w7	*	Simik	+	w6	*	Pi w7,	Simik,	w6,	Pi
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Number	of	turtles -.44 .03 -.31*
Average	betweenness	per	winning	coalition -.33 .02 -.27*
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Max	power	per	winning	coalition .56 .03 -.29*
Network	density -115.39 13.43 -.14*
Average	idea	value	per	winning	coalition .31 .02 .50*
Max	idea	value	per	winning	coalition -.24 .01 -.54*
Note.	R2=	.68.	*	p	<	.001
3.3 Using	the	stepwise	method,	a	significant	model	emerged	(F6,1443	=	514,675,	p	<	0.001).	As	shown	in	Table	5,	two	variables	have	slightly	larger
predictive	capability	on	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition:	number	of	turtles	and	max	betweenness	per	winning	coalition.	The	R2	shows	that	the
variables	account	for	68%	of	the	predictability	of	average	power	per	winning	coalition.	The	variable	network	density	yielded	no	significant	results.	To
make	sure	no	auto-correlation	exists	we	used	the	Durbin-Watson	statistic.	A	Durbin-Watson	value	of	1.80	(near	2)	implies	that	there	is	no	auto-
correlation.
	Discussion
4.1 The	correlation	scores	in	Table	4	inform	us	about	the	co-occurrence	of	variables.	We	see	that,	as	the	network	size	(number	of	turtles)	increases,	so
does	the	total	number	of	coalitions.	This	is	to	be	expected,	as	a	larger	network	implies	more	candidate	connections	between	people.	However,	a
decreasing	network	density	may	have	a	counter	effect	on	the	number	of	coalitions	that	is	formed.	Most	important	for	the	multiple	regression	analysis	is
that	there	is	no	relationship	between	the	independent	variables	(predictors)	number	of	turtles	and	network	density.	Otherwise,	the	multiple	regression
model	could	not	be	written	in	the	form	of	Y	=	c+b1X1+b2X2.
4.2 The	R2	of	.68	indicates	that	the	variables	in	Table	5	account	for	68%	of	the	predictive	value	of	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition.	Our	results	are
in	contrast	with	literature	that	shows	that	betweenness	centrality	influences	power	within	networks	(Brass	1984).	Table	5	shows	that	the	average
betweenness	centrality	of	a	winning	coalition	has	negative	predictive	power	on	the	average	power	of	a	winning	coalition.	The	study	by	Brass,	though,
was	not	designed	to	take	into	account	innovation	within	networks,	a	special	case	of	social	networks.	Subsequently,	we	see	a	positive	association	of	the
average	idea	value	per	winning	coalition	and	the	power	of	a	coalition,	in	line	with	our	reasoning.
4.3 Another	value	that	stands	out	is	the	network	density.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	we	used	relatively	small	variations	of	the	network	density,	thus
compensating	for	the	supposedly	high	association	observed	in	Table	5.
4.4 A	notable	observation	we	find	in	a	combination	of	Tables	4	and	5.	Average	betweenness	per	winning	coalition	correlates	moderately	high	with	the
average	power	per	winning	coalition	(-.57).	Besides,	it	has	a	negative	predictive	power	on	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition.	A	high
betweenness	often	means	that	one	has	a	lot	of	contacts	in	one's	social	network	that	others	do	not	have.	Having	lots	of	contacts	implies	one	cannot
maintain	close	relationship	with	all	contacts,	leading	to	an	increased	number	of	weak	ties.	Literature	is	suggestive	of	the	strength	of	weak	ties
(Granovetter	1973;	Hauser	et	al.	2007)	in	social	networks	(Granovetter	1973).	Especially,	networked	learning	(Jones	et	al.	2008)	and	networked
innovation	(Burt	2004;	Hauser	et	al.	2007)	value	weak	ties	as	predictors	of	successful	cooperation	in	networks.	Our	results	imply	practically	the	same;
Table	5	shows	that	average	betweenness	per	winning	coalition	has	negative	predictive	power	for	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition.	In	other
words,	having	high	betweenness	centrality	makes	it	easier	to	build	a	successful	coalition	as	one	needs	a	lower	average	power	to	succeed.
4.5 Another	interesting	observation	lies	in	the	negative	association	with	the	number	of	turtles	on	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition	(Table	5).	This
implies	that	as	the	network	size	increases,	it	becomes	easier	to	build	a	successful	coalition.	Although	other	factors	may	influence	the	process	as	well,
we	may	conclude	that	it	may	be	easier	to	form	a	successful	coalition	in	a	larger	network.
4.6 There	are	two	implementations	of	the	Shapley	value.	First,	we	have	the	situation	in	which	all	agents	form	a	coalition	at	once,	the	one	that	we	used	in
this	simulation.	Second,	the	agents	may	join	a	coalition	one	after	another.	In	case	of	a	high-betweenness	agent	attracting	a	lot	of	partners,	we	could
consider	using	the	second	method	of	coalition	formation	to	further	optimise	the	simulation.	Besides	improving	the	way	the	Shapley	value	is	calculated
and	used	for	the	formation	of	coalitions,	we	may	decide	to	implement	the	nucleolus.	The	Shapley	value	does	not	consider	the	expected	contribution	of
an	agent	to	a	coalition,	whereas	the	nucleolus	(Schmeidler	1969)	does.	During	payoff	distribution,	the	nucleolus	tries	to	minimise	the	maximum
dissatisfaction	of	participants	in	a	coalition.
	Conclusion
5.1 The	present	study	investigated	whether	network	characteristics	and	network	member's	characteristics	influence	the	average	power	per	winning
coalition.	To	aid	people	in	their	search	for	optimal	coalitions,	we	studied	the	dynamics	of	coalitions	in	networked	innovation.	We	ran	a	simulation	of
networked	innovation	under	rational	behaviour	(to	yield	optimal	decisions),	and	monitored	the	variable	variations.	Multiple	regression	analysis	led	to	a
model	that	predicts	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition	as	a	function	of	network	size	and	network	density.
5.2 The	current	study	allows	us	to	make	two	interesting	observations.	First,	average	betweenness	negatively	influences	the	average	power	per	winning
coalition.	This	means	that	having	high	betweenness	centrality	makes	it	easier	to	build	a	successful	coalition,	as	one	needs	lower	average	power	to
succeed	as	a	coalition.	Second,	the	number	of	network	participants	negatively	influences	the	average	power	per	winning	coalition.	This	implies	that	in
a	larger	network,	it	may	be	easier	to	form	a	successful	coalition.
5.3 The	regression	model	presented	in	this	paper	offers	interesting	uses.	Our	simulation	presumes	rational	play	by	network	participants.	In	other	words,
optimal	decisions	are	made	concerning	the	formation	of	coalitions.	Assuming	rational	play,	we	compute	how	coalitions	should	ideally	be	formed	within
networked	innovation.	An	important	implication	of	this	model	is	that	we	can	assist	in	real	life	networked	innovation	by	recommendation	of	optimal
coalitions	(with	a	necessary	average	power	or	betweenness	centrality),	given	that	we	know	what	the	network	density	and	network	size	are.
	Future	Work
6.1 The	model	presented	in	this	work	was	based	on	extensive	literature	review.	The	research	articles	that	we	studied	employ	empirical	methods	to
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determine	if	and	what	relationships	between	variables	exist.	We	combined	the	outcomes	of	several	influential	studies	to	develop	a	simulation	model.
We	programmed	agents	on	an	individual	level	to	study	the	emergent	dynamics	of	networked	innovation	(macro	level),	an	approach	that	is	characteristic
for	agent-based	social	simulation.	The	next	step	in	the	process	of	deriving	a	model	that	correctly	describes	reality	is	the	validation	of	the	model.	We
plan	to	validate	our	model	by	testing	its	behaviour	against	empirical	data.	Subsequently,	we	will	use	the	model	to	generate	optimal	coalitions	for
innovation	in	networks	in	an	empirical	setting.
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